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F'EJ{TUBED ABTIGt.ES 
The Problem With Nominees 
Roger Bernhardt and Jon H, Sylvester 
Introduction 
Brokers, as well as other real estate professionals, are 
justifiably confused about what it means when an offer to 
purchase real estate is made on behalf of a purchaser "or 
her nominee. " Can it lead to the formation of an enforce-
able contract or not? Of course, if the purchaser-call her 
Pearl-nominated Norma as her nominee, and Norma 
paid the price to the vendor, Van, and received a deed 
from him, it hardly matters that (perhaps) there never was 
any binding contract between Pearl and Van, and that ei-
ther or both of them might have earlier successfully as-
serted a defense to its enforcement because of a nominee 
clause. When it does matter, of course, is when the deal 
does not go smoothly. 
When litigation does follow, the reported decisions 
seem so inconsistent as to make us doubt whether a nomi-
nee clause amounts to anything more than an invitation to 
litigation. Some cases appear to hold that an offer so 
worded renders unenforceable any contract that might os-
tensibly arise by its acceptance, as well as any claim to a 
broker's commission based on having procured that offer. 
But other cases blithely enforce the resulting contract, ig-
noring the difficulties claimed to arise from the nominee 
language. Moreover, the cases that "uphold" the provision 
vary widely as to what they say it means. Consequently, 
do not expect to learn too much from the following brief 
review of the reported decisions. 
The Case Law 
Seven cases cause trouble to practitioners. They are all 
from the Second and Fourth Districts, although the dis-
agreements are within the districts, not between them. We 
describe them in chronological order. 
Cisco v Van Lew 
In Cisco v Van Lew (1943) 60 CA2d 575, 141 P2d 433 
(Fourth District), the original contract between Cisco and 
Van Lew was oral. When the broker opened escrow, he 
could not remember Cisco's name, so he listed himself or 
his nominee as the purchaser. Van Lew, the seller, tried to 
back out later when she got a better offer, but Cisco paid 
the purchase price into escrow and sued for specific per-
formance. He lost because the escrow instructions had 
been signed only by the broker (and Van Lew) and not by 
him, which meant that there was no consideration for a 
contract between Van Lew and Cisco since Cisco was not 
bound. The opinion also turned, in part, on the statute of 
frauds requirement of a writing that shows the identity of 
the purchaser. 
The language of the opinion makes it hard to tell 
whether mutuality or identity was the real problem, but 
the court did say, "The Ciscos are not described therein as 
being either parties to the contract or purchasers there-
under, and nowhere therein do they assume any of the ob-
ligations of purchasers." 60 CA2d at 582. Because Cisco 
had tendered the entire purchase price when he sued, it is 
difficult to see why an assumption of obligations would 
have mattered-paying the price seems considerably bet-
ter than promising to pay the price. The outcome may be 
better explained on the basis of a good many other unsa-
vory facts in the deal. Miller & Starr cite this case for the 
assertion that "[ w ]hen a contract identifies a named buyer 
'or nominee' without reference to the right of the buyer to 
assign the contract, generally there is not a sufficient iden-
tification of the unnamed nominee." 1 Miller & Starr, 
California Real Estate § 1 :21 (3d ed 2000). 
Gelber v Cappeller 
In Gelber v Cappeller (1958) 161 CA2d 113, 326 P2d 
521 (Second District), the Gelbers' escrow instructions 
stated that title would be vested in Pacific Side Investment 
Corp., an entity owned by them, and the Cappellers' deed 
named that corporation as grantee. When the Cappellers 
tried to back out, the Gelbers deposited the required note 
(signed by them) and deed of trust (signed by Pacific) and 
successfully sued for enforcement. Reversing the trial 
court, the appellate court upheld the arrangement as a 
contract for purchase by the Gelbers, "with title to be 
taken in the name of their nominee." 161 CA2d at 117. 
The deed of trust was properly executed by Pacific be-
cause, as grantee in the deed, Pacific was the only person 
who could execute it. Cisco v Van Lew, supra, was not 
cited. Miller & Starr say of this case, "When the instruc-
tions provide for a conveyance to the buyer or nominee, 
execution of the purchase money deed of trust by the 
nominee of the buyer, who is also a grantee, is sufficient 
performance to compel the seller to convey." 3 Miller & 
Starr §6:27. 
San Francisco Hotel Co. v Baior 
In San Francisco Hotel Co. v Baior (1961) 189 CA2d 
206, 11 CR 32 (Fourth District), "Fred Whitman or nomi-
nee" made a $1000 deposit on his offer to purchase, and it 
was signed "Fred Whitman or nominee by EMJ Agent." 
Escrow instructions called for title to be vested in "Lemhi 
or nominee." Lemhi and Whitman were officers in the 
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San Francisco Hotel Company, which thereafter deposited 
the balance of the price into escrow and gave instructions 
(signed by Lembi) to the escrow agent to name it as vestee 
in the deed, and Whitman assigned the contract to it. In 
upholding the Hotel Company's specific performance ac-
tion, the Foqrth District held there was consideration, "es-
tablished by commencement of the instant action as well 
as by tender of performance .... " 189 CA2d at 212. And 
there was no uncertainty (189 CA2d at 213): 
The buyer was Fred Whitman. The fact that he was referred 
to as 'Fred Whitman or nominee' did not affect his identity. The 
phrase 'or nominee' as used in the deposit receipt was merely 
surplusage. Whitman was entitled to assign the rights under the 
agreement, including the right to enforce specific performance 
[Citations]. If he did not choose to assign, as the purchase price 
was payable in cash, he could have nominated a vestee of the 
title without affecting his rights under the agreement. 
Because this was the same court that had gone the 
other way in Cisco v Van Lew, supra, the court had to say 
"that [the Cisco case] is clearly distinguishable from the 
one at bar in that the plaintiff in the cited case, who 
claimed as the nominee of a named buyer, has not re-
ceived an assignment of the buyer's rights but neverthe-
less was attempting to enforce the same in an action for 
specific performance." 189 CA2d at 213. 
Because fully deposited cash prices were involved in 
both cases (and the opinion had just explained that there 
was no need for a buyer to assign in a cash situation), the 
only remaining distinction is the hypertechnical one that 
the action in Cisco had been brought by the wrong plain-
tiff-i.e., the broker fronting for his nominee Cisco 
should have filed, rather than Cisco himself-although 
there is nothing in the language of Cisco to suggest that 
that was the point at the time. See 1, 2 Miller & Starr 
§§1.22, 5.12. 
Rivade/1 v Razo 
In Rivadell v Razo (1963) 215 CA2d 614, 30 CR 622 
(Second District), a broker claimed he had procured a 
ready, willing, and able purchaser and thereby earned a 
commission. Although most of the opinion turned on 
whether the offer matched the listing in light of its subor-
dination provision, the court went on to add (215 CA2d at 
625): 
[T]he words "or nominee" completely destroy the instrument as 
a firm and binding offer on the part of Firestone Corp. to buy 
the property. What it says is, in effect, that Firestone or someone 
else designated by Firestone will buy the property .... Assum-
ing defendant accepted the offer and that Firestone changed its 
mind, the latter could designate anyone as its nominee. The 
seller would then have to look to the nominee. The "nominee" 
would be an escape hatch for Firestone. Thus, it is apparent 
there was no binding, unqualified offer on the part of Firestone. 
On a sale for cash, where the credit of the buyer is not so impor-
tant a factor[,] an "or nominee" offer could possibly be con-
strued as an obligation on the part of the named purchaser to ei-
ther buy or see to it that the property is purchased. But, here, all 
the named buyer need do is to designate a substitute and walk 
away from the transaction." 
Nominee clauses thus look like certain death. 
This opinion did make a distinction between cash and 
credit purchases, and Miller & Starr pick up on it, stating, 
"There might be a difference if the sale was for all cash 
when the buyer's credit is less important, but when the 
seller is expected to finance a portion of the sales price, 
there is no person obligated to purchase the property with 
known trustworthy credit." 2 Miller & Starr §5.41. But we 
wonder about that distinction. Cisco was a cash deal that 
failed because of its nominee clause, whereas Gelber was 
a credit deal that was upheld despite such a clause. And 
unless the purchaser accompanies his offer with a tender 
of the entire price, is not every sale a credit sale until es-
crow actually closes? 
JMR, Inc. v Hedderly 
JMR, Inc. v Hedderly (1968) 261 CA2d 144, 67 CR 
742 (Second District) involved the following issue: When 
a buyer makes an offer on behalf of himself or "corporate 
nominee" to purchase, proposing to secure payment of the 
price by a "pledge of corporate stock," one would think 
that a binding contract with the nominee is unlikely to be 
found, even after the offer was accepted and the nominee 
named. But if the nominee plaintiff could show "that the 
contract was made in the contemplation of the formation 
of the plaintiff corporation, and for its benefit, and that it 
adopted and ratified the contract after its formation .... [, 
then] the plaintiff corporation may enforce the contract." 
261 CA2d at 148. Miller & Starr read this to mean that 
"[a] contract may be enforceable by a nominee when the 
identity of the nominee is known to the parties and the 
contract is for its benefit." 1 Miller & Starr § 1.21; see also 
2 Miller & Starr §5.41 ("[T]here is no material variation 
between the listing and the offer when the offer is on the 
terms and conditions of the listing but provides that the 
property will be purchased by a name buyer and the buyer 
reserves the right to take title in his or her own name or in 
the name of a 'nominee.' ") 
McCown v Spencer 
In McCown v Spencer (1970) 8 CA3d 216, 87 CR 213 
(Second District), a buyer was permitted to sue in his own 
name despite having named a nominee (with the seller as-
senting) as long as the arrangement did not amount to an 
assignment to the nominee. Only in the case of an as-
signment would the original buyer no longer be a proper 
plaintiff. (Miller & Starr do not cite this decision.) 
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C. Robert Nattress & Assocs. v Cidco 
In C. Robert Nattress & Assocs. v Cidco (1986) 184 
CA3d 55, 229 CR 33 (Fourth District), the offeror's suit 
failed when he could not show he had sufficient funds to 
purchase, and his proof that he intended to use the nomi-
nee clause to nominate F-who did have enough and was 
willing-was no help, because F was not a party to the 
action and could not be compelled to purchase. Miller & 
Starr cite this case for the proposition that "[s]pecific per-
formance may be denied if the purchaser is not adequately 
identified .... " 12 Miller & Starr §34.25; see also 12 
Miller & Starr §34.20. 
Illusory Promises and the Requirement of 
Consideration 
Of these seven cases, four validate nominee clauses 
and three repudiate them. What is perhaps most notewor-
thy is that six of the seven are reversals, giving trial courts 
a pretty high error rate for predicting how these clauses 
should be treated. With sufficient scholastic ingenuity we 
might attempt to reconcile these disparate results; we 
doubt, however, that much practical good would come of 
the exercise, since it would almost certainly involve nu-
ances too subtle to remember or apply. Getting to the nub 
of the issue, we think the problem is not with the reported 
decisions, but with the underlying clause. The confusion 
arises because a single provision is being used to cover 
many different needs. We believe that everyone would be 
better off if brokers gave some forethought to what their 
clients truly desire and then more carefully tailored their 
offers to match those desires. Instead of an all-purpose 
clause that only occasionally fits and rarely works, there 
should be specific clauses that do fit and will work. No 
clause will work, however, if it runs afoul of the most ba-
sic contract law principle of all-the requirement that a 
promise be real. 
For an offer to have the power to lead to an enforceable 
contract, the offeror's stated commitment must be real and 
not "illusory"; it cannot be only an apparent commitment, 
from which the offeror has reserved an unrestricted means 
of escape. Mattei v Hopper (1958) 51 C2d 119, 122, 330 
P2d 625; see also, generally, Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 177 (1981 ). So, returning to the fact situation 
hypothesized in the Introduction, if Pearl's offer to pay 
the price is subject to her unfettered discretion to walk 
away from it by transferring that burden to someone else, 
her promise is illusory and she has not made a real offer. 
If the offer is not real, there can be no binding acceptance 
of it, and no contract would arise between Pearl and Van, 
even though he signed "accepted" on her purported offer. 
In other words, if Pearl's promise is, in effect, that she ei-
~her will buy the property or she will not, at her pleasure, 
It provides no basis for enforcing Van's "reciprocal" 
promise to sell. (This can also be explained in terms of 
consideration: Van's promise to sell is enforceable only if 
it was supported by consideration, i.e., constituted an en-
forceable promise to buy; if Pearl's promise is illusory, it 
furnishes no consideration and Van is free to disaffirm his 
counter promise.) There is no such thing as a contract in 
which only one side is bound, and the other party has nei-
ther performed nor made a promise to perform. Once a 
court concludes that the clause allows a buyer to escape 
her obligation to perform, her seller will be held equally 
free to terminate the arrangement, even when the buyer 
may be actually seeking to perform. 
For the same reason, the broker may fail to earn a 
commission in such a situation. A commission is ordinar-
ily earned only if the broker procures a ready, willing, and 
able purchaser, which requires the existence of an offer 
that can lead to an enforceable contract; if the offer is "il-
lusory," there was, ipso facto, no ready and willing pur-
chaser. Thus, there is a real likelihood that an offer made 
on behalf of "Pearl or her nominee" will not entitle Van's 
broker to a commission, even when it fully matches the 
terms of his listing agreement. For the same reasons, even 
after such an offer has been accepted, the seller may avoid 
commission liability if he later decides to withdraw. 
However, offerors do not generally include nominee 
provisions merely to allow them to back out of their deals 
later on. Some of the possible objectives buyers may have 
in mind when they use the term "nominee" are: 
• Pearl might fully intend to remain bound by the obli-
gation to pay the price, and may merely want the 
flexibility of having title vest in a third person whom 
she intends to identify later (such as, for example, a 
business entity that has not yet been formed). 
• Pearl may intend to "flip" the contract to a new buyer 
(probably at a higher price), substituting the third 
party in for herself and walking away with no further 
liability. 
• Pearl may intend to assign her right to purchase the 
property, but is still willing to remain liable herself if 
her assignee fails to perform. 
We next consider these alternatives in the context of 
various deals. 
Vesting Title in a Third Party 
Cash Sales 
A contract identifying the buyer as "Pearl or her nomi-
nee" may mean simply that Pearl intends to have title vest 
in some name that does not currently appear in the con-
tract, e.g., in the name of Pearl's corporation, or in 
Norma's name, or in the name of both Pearl and Norma 
(e.g., as joint tenants). If a purchaser offers to pay all cash 
for the property, usually the vendor will not care about the 
identity of the ultimate grantee. (We are not here consid-
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ering those unique situations, e.g., when the vendor has 
some special objection to a particular purchaser, or when 
the purchaser has a special reason to keep her identity se-
cret.) Since Van can anticipate being paid in full before or 
at the time he is required to pass title to anyone, Pearl has 
no need to state in her offer her intent to nominate any-
one. If Van later objects to the insertion of Norma's name 
into the grantee blank on the deed, Pearl can simply take 
title in her own name and reconvey the property to Norma 
thereafter. 
Consequently, we suggest that when the purchaser in-
tends to perform the contract herself and use a nominee 
merely for title vesting purposes, she should not use the 
unqualified phrase "or her nominee" in her offer. Apart 
from the fact that such language may lead the seller to re-
ject the offer out of fear of a trap, the purchser runs the 
perverse risk that if the seller does accept it and then later 
changes his mind, a court may let him out on the ground 
that the contract was unenforceable because it was 
founded on an illusory promise. If a judge thinks that the 
language gave Pearl too much of a back door, she will not 
be able to close that door by saying that she never in-
tended to go out that way anyway. 
Thus, if an offeror truly wants no more than to later 
name a third party as vestee of the title, and to say some-
thing about that in her contract, she may include a nomi-
nee clause in her offer; but, then she should also include 
language along the following lines to qualify that clause: 
Reference to "nominee" in this offer is for convenience only 
and is intended solely to declare Purchaser's possible intent to 
subsequently include additional or other names as grantee(s) in 
the deed she is to receive after the price has been paid. Use of 
the word "nominee" shall not be construed as excusing Pur-
chaser from the duty of performing any and all obligations 
specified in this agreement or otherwise imposed by law upon 
her. 
Such a limitation on the scope of the clause should dis-
pose of any risk that use of a nominee renders the buyer's 
obligation illusory. The inclusion of such a clause should 
present no threat to the vendor, and should eliminate any 
danger of judicial invalidation. 
Credit Sales 
In California, a secured purchase money note given to 
the vendor is uncollectible except by way of foreclosure 
of the deed of trust. CCP §580b. Thus, if the vendor is be-
ing asked to accept a note secured by a deed of trust for 
the unpaid balance of his price, it might seem that it does 
not matter whether the offeror or her nominee executes 
the note, since neither party incurs any personal liability 
for it. The signature on the deed of trust must, of course, 
be that of the person identified as grantee on the deed, 
whether it is the purchaser, the nominee, or a new third 
party, but the signature on the underlying note is inconse-
quential in terms of creating any personal liability. Van 
may recover the property by foreclosure if his note is not 
paid, but he can sue neither Pearl nor Norma for defi-
ciency liability if the proceeds of the foreclosure sale do 
not satisfy the debt. And, because of California's "one ac-
tion" rule (CCP §726), Van cannot ignore his security and 
proceed solely on the note. (In the rare case where an un-
secured note is taken, the signature will matter, because 
there is no purchase money antideficiency protection in 
that case. Van Vleck Realty v Gaunt (1967) 250 CA2d 81, 
58 CR 246. There will be liability on the note, and that li-
ability will attach to the person who signed it. But, again, 
the identity of the grantee on the deed is irrelevant: One 
does not become liable on a note one has not signed 
merely by virtue of acquiring title to property whose pur-
chase generated the price represented by that note. If Pearl 
is the one who signed the contract obliging her to pay the 
price, she is the one who must sign the (unsecured) note, 
and the nominee clause cannot be read to permit Norma to 
sign it instead of her. Adding her nominee's signature will 
give Van the extra protection of having two makers to go 
after, but will not release Pearl from her liability as note 
maker.) 
However, although the identity of the buyer might not 
matter in legal theory, it may have practical significance 
to the vendor. A vendor may not want to collect his 
money through foreclosure and might prefer to have a 
credit-worthy buyer who will likely satisfy her payment 
obligations in a timely manner rather than compel a costly 
and time-consuming enforcement action. Thus, even in a 
credit sale, a clause that appears to possibly allow the of-
feror to substitute herself out of the contract may cause 
alarm to the seller, which can be ameliorated by the lan-
guage we proposed above. 
Substituting in a New Buyer 
For many brokers and players, the nomination clause is 
consciously intended to let the originator take herself out 
of the picture entirely, thereafter free from all price liabil-
ity the moment her nominee is named. Pearl's plan may 
be precisely to flip the contract over to someone else, 
make a profit, and then walk away, and move on to an-
other deal. This practice however, implicates some con-
tractual principles of which the parties may be unaware. 
Although it is common to speak of "assigning a con-
tract," that phrase is imprecise and misleading. Assign-
ment properly refers only to the transfer of a party's con-
tractual rights, which is generally permissible without the 
need for any express authorizing language in the contract. i 
The dislike of restraints on alienation is not confined to \ 
real estate; all contractual rights can be assigned except J 
when it is prohibited by statute or materially increases the 
r 





burden or risk on the other party. See generally Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts §317 (1981). 
However, an assignment affects only rights; it has no 
effect on an assignor's responsibility to perform duties 
created by the contract. The transfer of duties under a con-
tract is by "delegation," which is more restricted than the 
power to assign because a promisee generally has greater 
reason for concern about the identity of the promisor than 
has a promisor about the identity of the promisee. An ob-
ligor cannot automatically delegate away her contractual 
duties when the obligee has a substantial interest in hav-
ing those duties performed by the original obligor. 
This restriction, however, is most often invoked in per-
sonal services contracts, where a substitution might make 
a real difference. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§318(2) (1981). In a real estate case, it need not prevent, 
for example, Pearl's delegating to Norma the duty to pay 
the price owed to Van. Van has a legitimate interest in be-
ing paid, but not in being paid by Pearl in particular. 
Moreover, any claim he makes that he relied on Pearl's 
individual credit-worthiness is satisfied by the rule that 
she remains bound by her promise to him notwithstanding 
her delegation to Norma. If Norma does not pay, Van can 
compel Pearl to pay, as she originally promised. 
In a cash sale, therefore, Van should not care about as-
signment and delegation because he does not have to con-
vey the property until he receives the purchase price, and 
he retains the ability to recover from Pearl, the original 
promisor. This is almost certainly not what Pearl wants. 
What she desires is a "novation": an assignment of her 
rights, a delegation of her duties, and a release of her li-
ability for any nonperformance by Norma (her assignee/ 
delegee). The release component explains why a novation 
requires the express consent of the promisee. Van, after 
all, did not agree to enter into a deal with Norma. Pearl 
needs Van to consent not to the addition of Norma to the 
contract, but to the substitution of Norma for Pearl under 
it, with the crucial consequence of releasing Pearl from 
further liability on the contract. 
If this is Pearl's objective, she must be careful that her 
offer does not lead, on the one hand, to an unenforceable 
contract or, on the other hand, to a contract that binds her 
even after an assignment to Norma. The general "or 
nominee" clause language cannot be counted on to ac-
complish these objectives. 
The drafting problem here is to keep Pearl from back-
ing into the "illusory promise" problem discussed above. 
But her promise is illusory only if it gives her unfettered 
unilateral discretion to substitute herself out of the con-
tract. What her offer should say is what in fact is often 
proposed in response to sellers' counteroffers to nominee 
proposals: A seller's broker often advises the client to re-
spond to a nominee offer with a provision that prohibits 
assignment without consent and/or requires the assignee 
to assume the obligations under the contract as a precon-
dition to releasing the original offeror. These are wise 
provisions and we propose that the buyer herself include 
them without waiting for her seller to add them to the 
counteroffer. The following language could be used, for 
example: 
Purchaser reserves the right to assign her rights and to dele-
gate her obligations under this agreement to a third party to be 
subsequently named by her. Vendor understands and agrees to 
release purchaser from all obligations under this contract under 
the following conditions: 1) that Vendor's consent to said trans-
fer be first obtained, which assent shall not be unreasonably 
withheld, and 2) that said Assignee fully assume in writing all 
of the obligations of Purchaser under this agreement. Vendor 
agrees to execute any and all documents necessary to accom-
plish this result when these preconditions are met. 
If the seller accepts from the buyer an offer containing 
such a provision, the parties have created a two-stage con-
tract. As of that moment, and between themselves, both 
parties are bound and neither one is free to withdraw. 
Their promises are not illusory. If nothing else happens, 
each must go through with the deal: Pearl must pay and 
Van must convey. If, later on, Pearl desires to substitute 
Norma for herself, she has a right to do so, but it is not 
unrestricted-it can only happen with Van's consent. 
(This would require a one-sentence note stating, for ex-
ample, "I assent to the nomination of __ [Assignee]_ 
and hereby release __ [Purchaser]__ from all obligations 
under this contract.") And Van's right to withhold assent 
is similarly fettered, since he cannot be unreasonable in 
withholding it. (Civil Code § 1995.260, requiring reason-
able landlords' responses to tenants' proposals to assign 
leases in the absence of contrary language, may come to 
be used by analogy in contract cases.) If a court deter-
mines that Norma was an acceptable nominee, Van must 
convey to her (and she is probably a proper party plaintiff 
in litigation) and must release Pearl (who could also join 
in the action for a declaration that she is no longer bound 
by any of the contract provisions). If the court concludes 
that Norma does not qualify, Van is not bound to convey 
to her, and, at the same time, he can hold Pearl to the con-
tract, and she must either pay the price or find another ac-
ceptable substitute within the time allowed. 
Assignment of the Right to Purchase 
As mentioned above, we think it unlikely that the of-
feror's intent is to assign the right to purchase, while con-
tinuing to remain contingently liable for payment of the 
purchase price. But if that is what Pearl wants-i.e., sim-
ply the power to assign her contract rights to Norma, who 
would not be responsible for paying the price and whose 
presence does not relieve Pearl of that duty to pay-
nothing special needs to be said in the offer, whether cash 
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or credit; the all-cash situation takes care of itself, and the 
antideficiency rules effectively eliminate meaningful 
choice anyway. Likewise, the inclusion of a clause that 
says exactly that should give the vendor no reason to re-
ject the offer, for either business or legal purposes, nor 
should it furnish any basis for a court to refuse to enforce 
the resultant contract if the seller did accept and then later 
sought to withdraw. If either Pearl or Norma (or both) is 
prepared to pay Van, the source of funds will not matter; 
and if Van is not paid, his recovery rights are the same-
indeed better-than before: He can sue Pearl for damages 
or specific performance despite her "assignment," and, if 
Norma has assumed Pearl's duties, he will also have the 
same remedies against Norma. 
Even though special language is unnecessary, it may be 
wise for Pearl to specify her right to transfer, with lan-
guage similar to the following: 
Purchaser reserves the right to assign her rights under this 
agreement to a third party of her choosing. Vendor acknowl-
edges purchaser's right to do so, provided that such assignment 
, does not relieve purchaser of any and all personal liability for 
performance of purchaser's obligations under this agreement. 
Since this provision merely clarifies what is already the 
rule and adds nothing substantive to the contract, its in-
clusion should not weaken the attractiveness of an offer to 
purchase, at least once it is explained to the seller by his 
attorney. 
What happens if Van accepts an offer that contains 
such a clause and then later seeks to withdraw? If no as-
signment has yet been made, Pearl has the right to sue for 
damages or for specific performance. If the contract is 
otherwise valid, she can obtain specific performance of 
Van's obligation to convey to her. It may be tactically 
wiser, however, for Pearl to sue in her own name at this 
stage rather than to also seek to specifically enforce the 
right-to-assign clause; that feature can be taken care of 
later. 
If Pearl has already assigned, Norma should also be a 
proper plaintiff. Pearl may still be a necessary party if 
there are remaining obligations that she must perform. 
Norma probably qualifies as a third party beneficiary-an 
intended, rather than an incidental, third party beneficiary 
and with full enforcement rights. See Martinez v Socoma 
Cos., Inc. (1974) 11 C3d 394, 398, 113 CR 585. Van 
might disapprove of her as an assignee, but he has no 
automatic or guaranteed right to reject her, except for rea-
sons stated in the original agreement. 
When the Broker Is Entitled to a 
Commission 
In the title-vesting and assignment situations discussed 
above, the seller's broker should be entitled to a commis-
2005 
sion as soon as the seller accepts the offer, since the buyer 
has thereby qualified as a ready, willing, and able pur-
chaser acceptable to the seller. The substitution situation 
might appear to present more complexity due to uncer-
tainty over any future novation, but that turns out not to be 
the case. As we have shown, the original buyer and seller 
are locked into an enforceable contract even if no accept-
able substitute buyer is ever nominated. Therefore, the 
"ready, willing, and able" condition has been satisfied. 
Finding a substitute purchaser is not a contingency com-
parable to getting financing or approving inspection re-
ports (these latter types of contingencies are actually con-
ditions, which must be satisfied in order to activate the 
duties of the parties to the contract). 
Nevertheless, we suggest that the listing agreement, as 
well as the sales contract, include language to resolve any 
uncertainty about the broker's entitlement to a commis-
sion. The following language in the listing agreement be-
tween the seller and his broker should be acceptable to 
both sides in most situations: 
Broker shall be entitled to a commission upon presentation 
of any bona fide offer that matches the terms of this listing or is 
accepted by vendor. Presentation or acceptance of an offer 
which includes language that authorizes the purchaser to nomi-
nate or assign her rights to a third party shall not prevent an of-
fer from qualifying as a bona fide offer. Presentation of an offer 
which requires vendor to subsequently release purchaser upon ·}.'.· 
satisfactory substitution of a new purchaser and which is ac- .. 
cepted by vendor shall not entitle broker to a commission until 
such release is actually granted or when the sales contract 
closes, with or without such release. 
This provision sets forth rules that conform to the sales 
contract provisions covered earlier. If the offer matches 
the terms of the seller's listing or if the seller accepts it 
anyway, the broker may be then entitled to a commission 
even though the later right to nominate is included in it. 
When the offer instead proposes to substitute the buyer 
out, no commission is earned until the seller has accepted 
the nominee and the nominee has assumed the original of-
feror's obligations under the contract. 
Conclusion 
The courts are only partly responsible for the confusion 
surrounding the use and enforcement of nominee clauses. 
Yes, there is some inconsistency in the decisions, but the 
more basic problem is that buyers and their brokers try to 
use one "standard" clause to accomplish several distinct 
purposes. This problem will not be solved by some all-
encompassing and universally accepted judicial decision 
or statute making everything plain for everyone. The more 
practical solution is to draft clauses more carefully and ·~ 
tailor them more precisely to clients' desires. That will re- • 
quire some thinking by brokers about what their clients 
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really want and also some reduced expectations as to what 
an actually be accomplished. But brokers, buyers and 
~ellers-as well as their lawyers and the judges-will all 
be the better off for it. 
False Alarm? Effect of MacKinnon v 
Truck Insurance Exchange on Mold 
Exposure Claims 
Christopher R. Wagner 
Introduction 
After more than a decade of decisions confirming Cali-
fornia's adherence to the so-called "plain meaning" ap-
proach to insurance policy interpretation, the California 
Supreme Court appeared to abruptly change course when 
it issued its unanimous decision in MacKinnon v Truck 
Ins. Exch. (2003) 31 C4th 635, 3 CR3d 228. Despite an 
apparently unambiguous pollution exclusion contained in 
a landlord's commercial liability policy, the court refused 
to apply the exclusion and, in doing so, called into ques-
tion whether pollution exclusions can ever operate in resi-
dential situations. See 31 C4th at 653. 
The basis of the court's ruling in MacKinnon was that 
the absolute pollution exclusion in the policy was not 
"conspicuous, plain and clear." 31 C4th at 639. The su-
preme court has long acknowledged that exclusionary 
language in an insurance policy must satisfy this standard. 
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Jacober (1973) 10 
C3d 193,201, 110 CR 1. However, because of the court's 
willingness to use this rule-and others-as a basis for its 
analysis, the long-term impact of MacKinnon on Califor-
nia insurance law has been the subject of debate. Now 
that MacKinnon has been on the books for more than one 
year, an answer is emerging. MacKinnon will likely have 
a significant impact on how California courts interpret 
policy exclusions in the future because MacKinnon has 
re-focused judicial attention on the requirement that ex-
clusionary language be conspicuous, plain, and clear. 
However, MacKinnon will have only a marginal im-
pact on exposure-related bodily injury claims that mimic 
the MacKinnon fact pattern-such as asbestos and mold 
liability claims. Put another way, although the MacKinnon 
decision may substantially influence the way California 
courts analyze policy exclusions, ironically, it will have 
much less influence on how insurers handle exposure-
related claims similar to the claim addressed by the court. 
MacKinnon and the Supreme Court's 
Analysis 
The MacKinnon case arose from a claim against an 
apartment building owner for wrongful death, which al-
legedly occurred after a tenant was exposed to a pesticide 
sprayed to eradicate yellow jackets near the tenant's 
apartment. The trial court and the court of appeal both 
ruled that the absolute pollution exclusion contained in 
the apartment owner's general liability policy precluded 
coverage for this claim. Both concluded that the bodily in-
jury fit precisely within the rubric of the exclusion, which 
precluded coverage for bodily injury arising from a dis-
charge or release of "pollutants," defined as any irritant or 
contaminant, including "chemicals." Significantly, the 
wrongful-death complaint against the apartment owner 
specifically alleged that the pesticides that caused the in-
jury were "dangerous chemicals." 31 C4th at 640. 
Presented with a facially applicable exclusion, the su-
preme court was obviously troubled by the prospect that a 
pesticide exposure claim at an apartment building might 
be barred by the absolute pollution exclusion. This exclu-
sion-so the argument goes-was intended to exclude 
coverage for CERCLA-type pollution claims, not expo-
sure-related bodily injury that occurs in a residential set-
ting. Given the numerous quirks found in the court's opin-
ion, it appears that this visceral reaction to the facts of 
MacKinnon may have ultimately driven the court's analy-
sis. 
For instance, the court in MacKinnon relied heavily on 
the drafting history of the absolute pollution exclusion (31 
C4th at 643), even though such evidence had generally 
been considered inadmissible for purposes of interpreting 
unambiguous policy language (see ACL Techno!. v 
Northbrook Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. (1993) 17 CA4th 1773, 
1790, 22 CR2d 206; Mez Indus., Inc. v Pacific Nat'! Ins. 
Co. (1999) 76 CA4th 856, 871, 90 CR2d 721). The court 
also supported its opinion by referring to hypothetical 
situations not presented in the MacKinnon case. This was 
done even though such "slippery slope" arguments are 
generally not considered when analyzing insurance policy 
language. See Martinez v State Compensation Ins. Fund 
(1995) 32 CA4th 1589, 1593, 38 CR2d 639 ("The ques-
tion of ambiguity in an insurance contract addresses the 
circumstances of the present case, not a hypothetical un-
certainty wholly removed from the facts of the case."); see 
also Blumberg v Guarantee Ins. Co. (1987) 192 CA3d 
1286, 1296, 238 CR 36. More striking, though, was the 
supreme court's unprecedented citation to a LexisNexis 
Allnews word placement search in support of its thesis 
that the absolute pollution exclusion should not apply to a 
residential pesticide exposure claim. 31 C4th at 651. 
